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ABSTRACT
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially
useful, but more proﬁtable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator
remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important
role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy
of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-oﬀ between private and public rent-seeking. While it
is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not
true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement. When
the public sector itself is selﬁsh and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and
private rent-seeking together.
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ments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
In the pursuit of proﬁts, economic agents, be they large ﬁrms or
single individuals, seek to gain an advantage over direct competitors
by introducing new goods, services, and technologies. This leads to
continuous adoption of innovations, which are widely recognized as
the key to growth and development. Innovating is therefore a socially
valuable activity, and a classical example of the way in which the selﬁsh
pursuit of the private interest may lead to increased social welfare when
channeled through properly organized markets. The private advantage,
though, is greatly magniﬁed when the innovator is the sole supplier of
the new good, service, or process; everybody loves to be a monopolist,
and innovators are no exception to this rule. The felicitous coincidence
of private and public interest breaks down here, as social welfare is
generally harmed by the presence of monopolies.
Remaining, or becoming, a monopolist requires special skills and
abundant resources. Often, such skills and resources allow one to stay
ahead through relentless innovation. Not less often, though, abundant
skills and resources are invested in keeping the competitive advantage
by turning the innovation into a monopoly, either through various forms
of legal exclusion, or by making it very hard for competitors to imitate
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and reproduce the good.
1 We call this activity “rent-seeking”. At
the core of this paper is the observation that “A monopoly granted
either to an individual or to a trading company has the same eﬀect
as a secret in trade or manufacturers.” [Adam Smith, The Wealth of
Nations, I.vii.26]. The eﬀorts to grab either a granted monopoly, or a
trade secret we call, respectively, public and private rent-seeking.
A crucial question in current and past debates on innovation is the
role of intellectual property - especially patents - in fostering innova-
tions and their adoption. Whether intellectual property increases or
decreases innovation is uncertain. There are two main arguments in
favor of intellectual property. The ﬁrst is that without the beneﬁto f
a government monopoly, on account of increasing returns to scale, in-
novations would either not be produced at all or too few innovations
would be produced. In Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2002] we showed
that even in the absence of legal protection some, possibly most, in-
novations would be produced, so that at least there is a cost beneﬁt
trade-oﬀ between the deadweight loss of monopoly and the extra in-
novation that it would produce. However, we also showed that since
1Sometimes the instruments used to maintain exclusivity are rather extreme.
The Astronomical Clock on the Old Town Hall of Prague dates back to 1410 and,
so the story goes, the city had its manufacturer, Mikulas of Kadan, blinded once
the clock was completed to make sure copies could not be made for other cities.3
innovations require earlier innovations as input, it is far from certain
that government grants of monopoly actually increase innovation - they
may well lead to less innovation. Neither the industrial organization
nor the growth literatures have provided much in the way of empirical
evidence about these eﬀects; the debate remains therefore wide open
on the role that patent protection plays in fostering innovations, their
adoption and continuing economic progress.
There is however, a second argument in favor of intellectual prop-
erty. This correctly observes that rent-seeking is possible through the
private sector as well as the public, and that legal grants of monopoly
may mitigate the costs of private rent-seeking. This may well be pos-
sible. However, what is certain is that one of the strongest arguments
against existing intellectual property law is that it encourages socially
wasteful rent-seeking and regulative capture in the public sector. This
phenomenon has been largely ignored by economists. Here we begin
to remedy that gap by examining the political economy of intellec-
tual property and asking whether allowing public rent-seeking really
leads to a welfare improvement because of the consequent reduction in
private rent-seeking.4
That public rent-seeking plays an important role in the acquisition
of intellectual property is clear. The recent Sonny Bono copyright ex-
tension law is a good case in point: the U.S. Congress unanimously on
a voice vote extended copyright retroactively by 20 years - yet there
is no economic argument whatsoever in favor of retroactive extension
of intellectual property. Surprisingly, a U.S. Supreme Court that has
paid strong lip-service to the principle that the original language of
the Constitution matters upheld this extension in the Eldred Case, in
the face of clear language that Congress can grant copyright for only a
limited time. Other examples of public rent-seeking abound: in 1984
the pharmaceutical industry was given extended patent protection, in
1994 the term for all utility patents was extended from 17 to 20 years.
In one of the most dramatic examples of judicial legislation, the courts
enormously extended the range of patent protection to include “busi-
ness practices” in 1998. During the Reagan administration, the patent
examination system was reformed to make it possible to patent even
the vaguest of claims. Various legal devices, such as the “submarine
patent” are used to extend the length of protection, and patenting
of the well-known and obvious has become widely used to “greenmail”
ﬁrms into paying licensing fees. In the international arena, the U.S. has5
fought long and hard to force other countries to conform - retroactively
- to our patent and copyright law.
While there are clear social dangers of allowing the government to
grant monopolies, ranging from the ease with which they can be con-
cealed from public scrutiny, to the corruption of the political system,
as we pointed out at the start, rent-seeking is possible in the private
markets too. Hence the view that patents are a socially valuable sub-
stitute for trade-secrecy. Granting a legal monopoly in exchange for
revealing the “secret” of the innovation is one, apparently clean, way
to make innovations more widely available in the long run. However,
this argument has not been subject to much scrutiny by economists,
and indeed, in the simplest case it fails. Suppose that each innovation
can be kept secret for some period of time, with the actual length vary-
ing from innovation to innovation, and that the length of legal patent
protection is 20 years. Then the innovator will choose secrecy in those
cases where it is possible to keep the secret for longer than 20 years,
a n dc h o o s ep a t e n tp r o t e c t i o ni nt h o s ec a s e sw h e r et h es e c r e tc a nb e
kept only for less than 20 years. In this case, patent protection has
a socially damaging eﬀect. Secrets that can be kept for more than
20 years are still kept for the maximum length of time, while those
that without patent would have been kept for a shorter time are now6
maintained for at least 20 years. Indeed, it is important to realize
that outside the pharmaceutical industry, where the regulatory system
eﬀectively forces revelation in any case, trade secrecy is considerably
more important than patent. Indeed, in a survey of R&D lab managers
for processes, only 23% indicate that patents are eﬀective as a means
of appropriating returns, and for products only 35% indicate that pat-
ents are eﬀective. By way of contrast, 51% argue that trade-secrecy is
eﬀective in both cases.
2
Although in the simplest case, patent law does not impact on trade-
secrecy, in cases where it is possible to expend real resources in making
the secret less accessible, the innovator faces a real trade-oﬀ between
private and public rent-seeking. The goal of this paper is to examine
that trade-oﬀ and establish when patents may and may not yield an
eﬃciency gain. This eﬃciency gain may have two sources. First, private
rent-seeking may imply a higher social cost than public rent-seeking;
in this case social eﬃciency demands a legal monopoly on account of
the large social costs induced by private individuals pursuing trade
and industrial secrecy. Second, the pursuit of trade and industrial
secrecy may lead the innovator to restrain production of the new good
even more than a legal monopolist would, thereby imposing a larger
2Cohen et al. [2002].7
dead-weight loss upon consumers; in this case the concession of a legal
monopoly leads the innovator to safely expand capacity and allow for
a more rapid adoption of the good. Our analysis shows that both these
elements are indeed at play in a fairly simple and natural model of
private and public rent-seeking.
Our major new ﬁnding is that there may be greater secrecy with in-
tellectual property than without it. The public rent-seeking option has
positive value only after a certain critical level of productive capacity
is accumulated. Hence, an innovator that has purchased the option has
an incentive to keep the secrecy until that level of capacity is reached,
which can be achieved by investing substantially in the private rent-
seeking eﬀort. We show that this complementarity between public and
private rent-seeking may lead to higher expenditure on private rent-
seeking when the public rent-seeking option is available than when it
is not. There are many historical examples suggesting that this kind
of interplay between the private and the public channel to rent-seeking
may be a relevant source of social ineﬃciencies. A particularly start-
ling example
3 comes from the agricultural sector. Since the beginning
3Thanks to Julio Barragan Arce, a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota,
for teaching us these facts.8
of the XIX century, when the production of new seed and plant variet-
ies took a central place in the development of modern agriculture, and
until the 1960s, many new seeds were introduced but very few if any
were patented and enjoyed legal monopoly protection. The reason for
this was relatively simple: new seeds were technically not patentable
because seeds coming from natural reproduction could not be distin-
guished from those coming from plant breeders (the same did apply,
and apparently still applies, to cattle). This state of aﬀairs continued
until during the 1940s, after 50 years of research and thanks to a lot
of private and public research money, the hybridization technique be-
came available. To make a long story short, this technique allows for
the production of patentable seeds, as the hybrid seeds cannot be re-
produced (they are sterile), and only people that control the original
pure kinds of seeds can produce the hybrid through a monitorable fer-
tilization technique. From then on, lobbying from companies producing
hybrid seeds for new and special legislation for plant patents intensi-
ﬁed, and in 1960 the Plant Varieties Protection Act was enacted. This
is the most stringent patent legislation for agricultural products in the
whole world; it is this legislation that USA chemical monopolies are
trying to impose on the agricultural sectors of less developed econom-
ies. Hybrid seeds, which cost billions of private and public dollars to9
be developed, are neither particularly more productive nor socially (as
opposed to privately) valuable than traditional ones. They are, instead,
patentable, which allows their producers to establish and maintain a
monopoly power. Notice, in particular, that if the option of eventu-
ally purchasing patents for the hybrid seeds had not been available,
resources would not have been wasted in the ﬁrst place to develop the
hybridization technique. This is a good example of socially damaging
reinforcement between private and public rent-seeking.
This interaction is a natural outcome of our model, but goes dramat-
ically against established wisdom. It shows that the idea of a beneﬁcial
trade-oﬀ between the two kinds of rent-seeking activities may well be
an illusion, thereby bringing the theory closer to the facts of life. We
prove that such a perverse eﬀect is always at play when the private cost
of public rent-seeking is relatively high; in particular, when the cost of
public rent-seeking is so high that an innovator is indiﬀerent between
purchasing or not purchasing the public monopoly option. One may
therefore be led to conclude that all that is needed is a benevolent so-
cial planner setting the cost of public rent-seeking low enough to make
this perverse eﬀect vanish. This is correct: all that is needed is a be-
nevolent social planner, if we had one. The usual perspective is one
in which the government can perfectly commit to a socially eﬃcient10
mechanism. In practice, governments committing to socially eﬃcient
mechanisms are less common than complete contingent markets. As we
brieﬂy reminded above, in reality we observe that, through a process
of “regulatory capture”, governments eventually become part of the
overall rent-seeking system. We examine the latter perspective in our
ﬁn a ls e c t i o nw h e r ew ee n d o g e n i z et h ec o s to fo b t a i n i n gap a t e n t .H e r e
we are looking at the polar opposite of the usual case; in the usual case
commitment is complete and institutions function perfectly; when the
government is rent-seeking, institutions do not function in the social
interest. We show that this has potentially devastating consequences
for innovation and welfare. The rent-seeking regulator will set the cost
of public monopoly near the level at which the innovator becomes in-
diﬀerent between exercising or not the public monopoly option. At
this level, as we just argued, the level of expenditure in private rent-
seeking activities is maximized. This leaves the question of the extent
to which institutional commitment is possible. We think that a com-
plete absence of patent rights can be institutionally committed. It is,
for example, easily veriﬁable, which increases the chances of sticking
to the commitment. We suspect that anything less is likely to be sub-
verted, as witnessed by the many examples of rent-seeking extensions
of intellectual property law cited above.11
Related Literature. Little has been written about the trade-oﬀ
between secrecy and public rent-seeking beyond the bland and incor-
rect assertion that patents lead to revelation of secrets that would not
o t h e r w i s eb er e v e a l e d .T h e r ei sas m a l ll i t e r a t u r et h a tf o c u s e so nt h ei n -
formation revelation process that occurs during patenting (Anton and
Yao [2000]) and on its role in patent races (Battacharya and Ritter
[1983)], Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski [1985]). Okuno-Fujiwara
et al. [1990] examine how disclosing information that changes beliefs
m a yw o r kt oaﬁrm’s advantage. Ponce [2003] considers the possibility
that by disclosing a secret, a rival might be prevented from patent-
ing the idea. This leads to the possibility that secrecy may actually
increase with patent protection. We should note also that this literat-
ure usually focuses on oligopoly, assumes there are no costs in public
rent-seeking and does not consider the issue of timing. The political
economy of intellectual property law has been even less well examined.
Scotchmer [2002] examines the political economy of patent treaties -
an important topic, but not one directly related to the issue of public
versus private rent-seeking.
From a broader perspective we are also interested in the utilization of
patents over the life-cycle of industry. Our intuition based on industry
case studies is that they play a relatively unimportant role in the early12
life of the industry when demand is still quite elastic and the number
of entrepreneurs is very large. It is in the mature stage where demand
is inelastic, few ﬁrms are either around or entering, and returns on
innovative eﬀorts are low, that the competition for innovation ceases
and the competition for government grants of monopoly begins. The
computer software industry seems like a case in point, with legal action
taking center stage only as the industry matured, and Microsoft gained
substantial monopoly power, while the innovation rate stagnated or
even declined in spite of the stronger legal protection awarded to IP.
4
As a ﬁrst step, we focus here on the optimal timing of protection for a
single innovator, establishing that it is later rather than earlier in the
product life-cycle that patent protection is worth paying for. In other
words, here we concentrate only on the impact of demand elasticity
on public rent seeking. In particular, we do not consider the fact,
especially important in early stages of an industry, that innovations
build on each other. As many authors have pointed out, see Scotchmer
[1991], Boldrin and Levine [1997, 1999], and Bessen and Maskin [2000],
for example, patents are especially costly in this context.
In understanding this paper, it is useful to begin by asking what
positive role can patents and other forms of intellectual property (IP)
4As documented, among others, by Bessen and Maskin [2000].13
have. On the one hand, when the sole innovator has no access to the
secrecy-keeping technology, then either imitation or market acquisi-
tion of the new technology leads to expansion of productive capacity,
competition, and eﬃciency. On the other hand, when many individuals
innovate simultaneously the minimum size restriction typical of innova-
tion must not be binding, in which case, again, an environment without
monopoly rights maximizes social welfare. The presence or absence of
a secrecy enhancing technology is irrelevant in such circumstances, as
nobody has any incentive to use it. This much we have shown in Boldrin
and Levine [1997, 1999, 2002], where some of the social costs of allow-
ing for patents, copyrights, and other forms of IP in the environments
just illustrated are documented. A corollary of our argument is that
reverse engineering, if it takes place in competitive markets, is socially
beneﬁcial even when it involves a set-up cost. This follows from the
observation that reverse engineering is just another means of expand-
ing productive capacity for the new good. Under perfect competition,
if it is proﬁtable to use it to expand capacity, then it is also socially
useful. This observation rids us of one of the most frequently abused
arguments supporting IP, and patents in particular: that patents, by
forcing the disclosure of the innovative secret, avoid the socially waste-
ful “rediscovery” of the same idea by future imitators. This argument14
relies either on the existence of some negative external eﬀect, whose
nature is obscure to us, or on the assumption that pure or disembodied
“ideas” have economic and productive value, which is patently false.
If patents, though, are necessary neither to induce innovation (when
competitive rents provide plenty of incentives), nor to avoid “wasteful
rediscovery” (when reverse engineering is socially valuable) then: what
are patents good for? The answer must be found in a situation where
there is not a great deal of simultaneous innovation, the ideas that are
patented cannot lead to further valuable innovation, and private secrecy
is eﬀectively enforceable. In this case IP may serve two purposes. First,
it may serve to increase the incentive to innovate in the presence of
ﬁxed costs. This idea has been extensively examined, and we will not
re-examine it here. Second it may help avoid wasteful expenses in
private secrecy, which we call here “private rent-seeking.” Consider,
for instance, the case in which private investment in secrecy is eﬀective
because it reduces the risk of being imitated, but has substantial social
cost. In this case it is possible that “public rent-seeking” in the form
of publicly enforced IP may be a cost eﬀective replacement for private
secrecy. This tradeoﬀ between the social costs of private and public
rent-seeking is at the heart of this paper.15
2. The Model
As indicated, our focus is not on the role of intellectual property
in promoting innovation, but rather on the impact that the substitut-
ability between private and public rent-seeking may have on the rate
of adoption of innovations, and on the IP policies that optimize social
welfare. For this reason we shall examine the case of a single innovator,
who has already produced an innovation and, at a private cost, can re-
duce the chances that others may imitate his product. We make the
twin assumptions that the innovator starts out as a natural monopol-
ist, and has access to a private technology to enhance secrecy, because,
as we have argued, these are the circumstances in which a publicly
enforced system of IP may serve a beneﬁcial purpose.
Three observations about innovation are captured in our model.
First, it takes time to ramp up productive capacity for a new product.
Second, in the absence of legal protection it is possible for the innov-
ator to achieve a degree of monopoly through secrecy; such degree of
secrecy varies from innovation to innovation. Third, ideas are useful
only insofar as they are embodied in either people or things, hence
the leaking of industrial secrets about innovation has an impact only
insofar as the secrets are embodied in new productive capacity.16
Our perspective is one in which making copies of the new good re-
quires productive capacity. We model productive capacity by merging
two ingredients, capital (either physical or human, as we will see mo-
mentarily) and the secret, or idea. It is useful to think of two polar
cases. In the ﬁrst case, the entire idea behind the new product is
embodied in a particular type of machine. By building the machines
himself and exercising physical control over them, the innovator can
attempt to retain his monopoly power over the new idea.
5 In this case,
productive capacity is equal to the number of existing machines, which
grows only if the owner of machines allows them to grow. Further,
whatever is valuable in the innovation is embodied in the machines.
Eventually, due to some random event, the secret may escape the in-
novator’s control. In this case monopoly power is not lost as all pro-
ductive capacity is still in the hands of the initial innovator. Because of
this, he is still a monopolist, at most facing a competitive fringe. This
5Or at least until the innovation is independently discovered. As mentioned, we
will not examine the possibility of independent inventions in this paper; while pat-
ents can be and are used to hinder independent discovery, the economic rationale
supporting this is quite weak. As we have argued, in the absence of patents, sim-
ultaneous discovery can be an eﬃcient event which increases productive capacity
and social welfare. Scotchmer [1991] also makes the case that IP protection should
not be strong in the face of independent discovery.17
we call the Coca-Cola case. At the opposite extreme, almost everything
that is valuable in the idea is embodied in the human capital of each
worker hired and trained by the innovator. The innovator, neverthe-
less, does retain the “last piece of the puzzle”, which is necessary to
turn workers into productive capacity. When this last piece is revealed,
again due to a random event, any and all workers may independently
start production of the ﬁnal good. Hence, in this second case product-
ive capacity is the number of trained workers. The latter is controlled
by the innovator until a random event reveals the secret to the work-
ers. After the random event, the innovator must compete with his own
workers. This we call the Napster case, because, after the secret is
revealed, it is functionally equivalent to the model studied in Boldrin
and Levine [1999]. We describe that model here brieﬂy, to provide an
additional interpretation of the formalism adopted and facilitate later
references to results. In that model the valuable idea is completely
contained in the ﬁnal good (a CD) which is durable. Anyone who has
purchased the CD can easily see how it is made, and produce their own
copies. Productive capacity corresponds to the cumulated number of
copies of the CD, as the remaining inputs needed to copy are available
to anyone at competitive prices. In this case secrecy is impossible (as
the aforementioned “last piece of the puzzle” is absent) and, barring18
legal restrictions, the innovator is in direct competition with his cus-
tomers as soon as he makes a sale. Hence, capacity grows over time as
additional copies are made and sold, and competition reigns from the
outset.
Our model will allow these two extremes, as well as intermediate
cases. Speciﬁcally, if the “last piece of the puzzle” becomes known
when productive capacity is k we assume that a fraction of capacity
α remains in the hands of the original innovator, with the remaining
fraction 1−α falling into the hands of competitors. In the Napster case,
α =0while in the Coca-Cola case α =1 .N o t et h a tw ea s s u m et h a tt h e
“last piece of the puzzle” follows the traditional model of diﬀusion of
ideas - once revealed, it spreads instantaneously and costlessly. It is a
striking fact that even if a large portion of the idea is immune from the
costs ordinarily associated with information transmission, the fact that
a remaining portion of the idea is subject to the ordinary constraints
of scarcity is enough to enable the originator of the idea to obtain the
full competitive rent in the form of the present value of all downstream
proﬁts generated by the original idea.
2.1. Production and Consumption. Producing consumption requires
two ingredients, capital, and the secret needed for turning capital into
productive capacity. As noted, in the Coca-Cola case the secret is19
completely embodied in the machines. Once you get your hands on
one machine you control its secret; as machines reproduce themselves,
owners of machines control productive capacity and its growth rate.
In the Napster case the secret is embodied in workers, minus the little
detail controlled by the innovator. As long as workers work for the in-
novator, they constitute productive capacity. When working independ-
ently, they are completely unproductive until the secret is revealed. In
both cases we denote productive capacity by k. Initial capacity, held
b yt h es o l ei n n o v a t o r ,i sk0. To simplify computations we adopt a con-
tinuous time model, and assume the real interest rate r is ﬁxed. We
adopt the simplest formalism for increasing capacity over time: as in
Quah’s [2002] 24/7 model, or in a learning by doing model, capacity
grows at ˙ k ≤ γk, with equality unless the owner of k exercises his power
to freely dispose of capacity.6
Productive capacity produces consumption. The ﬂow of consump-
tion is c(t) ≤ k(t), with equality holding unless the owner of the stock
of capacity elects to withdraw some from production. There is a single
6In what follows we assume this growth rate to be independent of how many
people are privy to the secret. The maximum growth rate of capacity is likely to in-
crease when the secret is revealed. In this case some of our results are strengthened,
as we note when relevant.20






where m is the numeraire good. In addition to productive capacity,
consumption may need other resources to produce. We assume that
this industry is small, so that the other resources are obtained at the
ﬁxed price w. Hence, the instantaneous cost of producing c units of
consumption is wc. Concerning utility and cost, we assume
Assumption 2.1. u(c) is thrice continuously diﬀerentiable, and u0(0) >
w.
W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne instantaneous proﬁts π(c)=m a x {0,u 0(c)c−wc}.
We assume that these are well-behaved in the following sense
Assumption 2.2. π(c) is single peaked, with a maximum at c = M.
For future reference, let C>0 denote the value of output at which
π(C)=0 .
2.2. Monopoly and Competition. We assume that the innovator’s
objective is the average present value of proﬁts. Consider ﬁrst the case
in which the innovator has a complete monopoly, that is: he controls
all productive capacity from beginning to end. This corresponds to the21
case of α =1 .T h ea v e r a g ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fp r o ﬁts is r
R ∞
0 e−rtπ(c(t))dt.
Facing a capacity constraint that grows at a constant rate, and a single-
peaked proﬁt function, the optimal plan for the monopolist is clear
enough: allow capacity to grow as rapidly as possible until the proﬁt
maximum is reached at k = M, then stop investing, and leave capacity
ﬁxed at M.L e ts =( 1 /γ)log(M/k0) denote the time at which k(s)=
k0eγs = M. Note, for future use, that the “time to the proﬁt maximum”








for the average present value of proﬁts accruing to this plan beginning
with an initial capital stock of k. It is straightforward to see that, in
light of our assumption about π, the function R1(k) is maximized when
the initial condition satisﬁes k = M.
Consider next the case in which there is complete competition. Here
the innovator controls a negligible share of total productive capacity,
that is: α =0 , and he is in direct competition with the imitators.
Since, even in this case, every available piece of productive capacity
must derive from the original unit held by the innovator, and since
imitators compete with each other bidding their own proﬁts to zero, as
in Boldrin and Levine [1999], the innovator still earns the competitive22
rent, which is the average present value of proﬁts. However, contrary
to the previous case, the growth of productive capacity is out of the
control of the innovator; competition between many producers leads
capacity to expand at the greatest possible rate, and output to expand
to the point at which proﬁts fall to zero. So the competitive rent,







Recall that we have deﬁned proﬁts to be zero when capacity is such that
marginal cost would exceed price, that is, when productive capacity is
larger than C. We show in Lemma A.2 of Appendix A that R0(k) is
maximized at a stock of capital M0 <M. The subscripts zero and one
in R0(k),R 1(k) are meant to remind us that α =0 ,α=1 , respectively,
hold here; later on we will introduce the function, Rα(k),f o rt h eg e n e r a l
case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This has a maximizer M0 ≤ Mα ≤ M1 = M,w h i c h
by Lemma A.2 is shown to be strictly increasing in α ∈ [0,1].
It is interesting to examine the diﬀerence between monopoly proﬁts
and competitive rents, R1(k) − R0(k).R e c a l l t h a t e−rs =( k0/M)r/γ,
and that in both cases, capacity, and hence proﬁts, grows as quickly
as possible until the proﬁt maximum is reached at M. Hence the
diﬀerence between monopoly proﬁts and competitive rents is simply23
their diﬀerence at M d i s c o u n t e db yt h et i m ei tt a k e st or e a c hM.
R1(k) − R0(k)=( k/M)
r/γ (π(M) − R0(M)).
This is an increasing function of k: the higher initial productive capa-
city is, the stronger the incentive to retain monopoly power. The key
observation from comparing monopoly and competition is that both
competitive rents and monopoly proﬁts constitute the present value
of a future proﬁt stream: the beneﬁto fm o n o p o l yi st h a ti tm a k e si t
possible to keep capacity from expanding beyond M,t h e r e b yk e e p i n g
proﬁts at their maximum forever.
Two additional remarks. Neither the value of R1(k) nor that of
R0(k) depend on the probability of losing the secret, because in the
ﬁrst case the secret is, from a practical point of view, never lost, while
in the second it is lost immediately. Suppose the stock of capital at
the time the secret is lost is k. By analogy, then, we will also deﬁne
Rα(k) for values of α ∈ (0,1) as a function of the stock k when the
secret is lost. This will facilitate comparison and computations in the
subsequent analysis.
2.3. Rent-Seeking. Our goal is to consider the implications of allow-
ing rent-seeking behavior. We now assume the innovator faces the risk
of his secret leaking out, which, in conjunction with the reproducibility24
of the stock of capital, would force him to face competition in sub-
sequent periods. This possibility induces rent-seeking by the innovator,
who would like to behave like a monopolist by controlling capacity. He
can do so privately, by keeping key ideas surrounding the innovation
secret and by designing the product to make reverse engineering diﬃ-
cult. However, once the secret leaks out, it cannot be made unsecret.
Thus, our model of private rent-seeking is one in which the innovator
chooses an eﬀort level of a to keep the secret. We let a be the up-front
cost; there may also be an ongoing cost, including the possibility that
making the product less easy to reverse engineer makes it less useful to
consumers. An example would be crops that are genetically engineered
to be sterile, thereby preventing farmers from reproducing them. As
long as the innovator must commit at the initial time to a particular
level of ongoing cost, we may capitalize the expected present value of
this cost into the initial up-front cost a, so the only loss in generality
is that we do not consider the possibility that the ongoing cost may
be endogenously chosen to be time-dependent. Given the eﬀort level
measured by a, there is a chance that the secret is lost. This occurs
a c c o r d i n gt oaP o i s s o np r o c e s sw i t hi n t e n s i t yp a r a m e t e rλ(a).7 Natur-
ally, λ is decreasing in a; assume this occurs at a decreasing rate. It
7Little of substance would change if it were made to depend also upon current
or cumulated output. It would only increase the incentive to reduce capacity and25
is natural to think of the secret being lost through reverse engineer-
ing (either on the product in the Coca-Cola case, or by workers in the
Napster case) and the success of the reverse engineering to depend on
the eﬀort made to acquire the secret. We do not explicitly model the
reverse engineering eﬀort, treating it as exogenous. Notice, however,
that the cost of reverse engineering will be accounted for in the price
paid to acquire the product. Keeping secrecy by means of this kind of
a eﬀort, we call private rent-seeking.
We wish also to consider the possibility of public rent-seeking, that
is rent-seeking through the legal system. This rent-seeking takes place
through the purchase of a legal monopoly. Since existing patent terms
are quite long (20 years) we assume the monopoly lasts forever, and
do not consider the question of optimal patent term. Other forms of
IP, such as non-disclosure agreements may last forever anyway. To
completely acquire a legal monopoly, in reality, requires potentially
several costs. Initially, the innovator must pay a cost b0.T h i s m a y
correspond to the need to ﬁle for patent protection as soon as possible
and to the fact that non-disclosure agreements must be signed prior to
revealing the good; or to other elements that might either practically
output to maintain secrecy. This we can pretend to be captured by the social cost
of private rent-seeking, wa, discussed below.26
or legally require an initial payment. Second, at some time at or before
the secret is revealed and the monopoly purchased, an additional cost
b1 might be incurred. For example, it may be possible to anticipate
the revelation of the secret, and take out a patent immediately before
it is revealed, or purchase a submarine patent, surfacing only when the
secret leaks out. In addition a third cost may be incurred every time
the legal monopoly is enforced. This cost, which is not modeled here,
might include, for example, the legal cost of bringing violators to court,
which takes place obviously after the secret is revealed.
Monopoly power allows the innovator to control capacity. Initially,
the innovator has a defacto monopoly, and chooses how much a to
expend, and whether or not to expend b0.T h i sﬁxes λ the instantaneous
probability of the secret leaking out. In any case, the innovator enjoys
a monopoly until the Poisson event of the secret being lost occurs. Up
until this time, the innovator is assumed to have complete control over
capacity through his unique knowledge of the secret. If he chooses the
initial expenditure of b0 he also has the option during this period of
paying b1 and getting a legal monopoly - but since the interest rate is
positive, it is better to wait. When the Poisson event occurs, if he has
not done it before, and if he has made the initial expenditure b0,t h e27
innovator must decide whether to expend b1 to secure legal monopoly
or not.
What happens when the secret is lost? This is potentially quite com-
plicated. The secret, like capital, may take some time to spread. In
fact, the slow speed at which ideas spread is probably one of the key
empirical factors making patents and IP redundant or socially dam-
aging in many cases. Still, given the scope of this paper, we shall
simplify the analysis and stack the odds in favor of IP by considering
the extreme case in which the secret spreads instantaneously once it is
uncovered. Still, to take advantage of the secret requires competitors
to have a stock of capital of their own. In the Napster case, the stock
of capital is not controlled by the innovator, but rather by his workers
or customers, who, once the secret is available, turn capital into pro-
ductive capacity and become competitors. More precisely, under the
interpretation of capital as the human capital of the workers, once the
secret is revealed the workers set up a large number of independent and
competitive ﬁrms producing the good. However, in the Coca-Cola case
the productive capacity takes the form of specialized physical capital
that belongs to the innovator. In this case, even if the Poisson event
occurs and the secret is made public, new machines owned by the com-
petitors will take time to build, while the innovator still retains all or28
at least a large fraction of his machines. This issue is both relevant
and delicate, so we discuss it next in some detail.
To be concrete we shall assume that, after the secret is revealed only
af r a c t i o n0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the capital remains with the innovator. The
remainder portion of capacity 1 − α is transferred to the competitors,
through means we will discuss momentarily. Due to competition, this
capacity grows as quickly as feasible, that is at the rate γ.T h e r e -
maining level of investment is controlled by the innovator, who, like a
monopolist faced with a competitive fringe, may choose how quickly to
grow his own capacity, up to the maximum growth rate of γ.N o t i c e
that faced with a competitive fringe, the innovator will wish to move
towards his best response to the ﬂow of output produced by the fringe
ﬁrms. This will increase his own proﬁt, but will not increase industry
proﬁts and may in fact reduce them. This would be the optimal re-
sponse of the innovator after the secret is leaked, if it were not the case
that, in fact, he has a vested interest in maximizing the proﬁtl e v e lf o r
the whole industry. The reason is simple: to the extent the innovator
knows that there is a chance the secret will leak, he can act in such a
way to sell part of his capacity to competitors before the event leaks.
T h i sc a nb ed o n ei nav a r i e t yo fw a y s ,f o re x a m p l e ,b ys e l l i n gt h eg o o d s29
themselves (the Napster case of Boldrin and Levine [1999]), by train-
ing workers at an implicit fee deducted from their wages (the Napster
case when capital is human capital), via proﬁt sharing agreements, by
sale of parts of the equipment not carrying the secret, or by a variety
of contingent contracts. The key point is that the price at which the
innovator can sell his capacity depends on industry proﬁts after the
secret leaks out. In other words, before the secret leaks out, the innov-
ator has an incentive to commit to maximizing industry proﬁts after
the secret leaks, because this choice maximizes the prices at which he
can sell capacity. This commitment problem, however, is easily solved.
The innovator would like to commit to keeping industry output high,
and not lowering towards his best-response. The commitment can be
as simple as selling advance orders. These advance orders can be con-
tingent on when the secret is revealed, and whether he chooses to use
the option of a public monopoly, but we will see later that the optimal
plan in these contingencies is consistent with honoring the advance
orders anyway, so he need not do so. Our assumption, then, is that
through precommitment, if the innovator chooses not to use the option
of public monopoly, he chooses his output after the secret leaks out to
maximize industry proﬁt.30
2.4. An Example. It is useful to have a concrete example of how this
model works. We adopt the following example from an episode of the
television series The Simpsons. Let us imagine a good that is an alco-
holic beverage called a “ﬂaming Moe” made from Tequila, Schnapps,
Crème de Menthe, and the secret ingredient: Krusty Non-Narkotik
Kough Syrup.8 To produce this beverage requires careful combination
of the ingredients. The stock of productive capital is represented by
skilled bartenders who are trained to carry out this elaborate process.
However, only Moe, the innovator, knows that the “missing piece of
the puzzle” is Krusty Non-Narkotik Kough Syrup. The bartenders do
not know what it is, and Moe adds the secret ingredient at the end.
Each bartender requires an assistant, and after some period of time,
the assistant becomes trained. Initially Moe hires an assistant, and the
two of them produce some small amount of the compound. Once the
assistant is trained, they acquire two assistants, one for each, and pro-
ductive capacity expands in a series of franchises. At some point, the
secret leaks out - and word quickly spreads that the secret ingredient
is Krusty Non-Narkotik Kough Syrup. At this point, the bartenders
no longer need to work for Moe, and all start production on their own;
in this case α =0 . While it might seem that all is lost to Moe at
8We are grateful to Sami Dahklia for bringing this example to our attention.31
this point; in fact, this is not true. In addition to the proﬁth ee a r n e d
prior to the revelation of the secret, he can still lay claim to the entire
expected average present value of proﬁts his workers will make on their
own once the secret is revealed. This is because he can charge the em-
ployees for the knowledge that will, once the secret is revealed, become
useful to them. Competition among potential employees will reduce
their proﬁts to zero. Notice that this second source of revenues for the
innovator must be computed as an expected value: when he hires the
ﬁrst assistant the latter faces an expected arrival time of the Poisson
event, which will make her an independent producer. The innovator
will charge her for the expected value of the proﬁts she will make after
she opens up shop. Such expected value, clearly, depends on the ex-
pected arrival date of the Poisson event. As Becker [1971] says,“Firms
introducing innovations are alleged to be forced to share their know-
ledge with competitors through the bidding away of employees who are
privy to their secrets. This may well be a common practice, but if em-
ployees beneﬁt from access to salable information about secrets, they
would be willing to work more cheaply than otherwise.” Notice, though,
that since the innovator has the option of purchasing a legal monopoly,
employees will insist on a contract in which they are reimbursed by the32
innovator if he chooses to purchase the monopoly. Monopolistic ﬁrms
do tend to be particularly generous with their employees.
In our model then, even if both private and public rent-seeking op-
portunities are absent, the innovator is still holding claim to the entire
stream of proﬁts. Assume, in fact, that the probability of the secret
leaking out is exogenous and that, once the secret is revealed, the whole
industry goes competitive instantaneously. Still, when introducing the
new good our hero looks forward to earning monopoly proﬁts until the
secret is revealed, plus the whole competitive rents earned by the in-
dustry from this time onward. To the extent he retains a fraction α>0
of total productive capacity after the secret leaks, he can do better than
that. He can commit to the following strategy: once the secret leaks
and a portion (1−α) of the industry goes competitive, thereby growing
at a rate γ, the innovator can let the total productive capacity grow
until the industry’s proﬁt maximum of M is reached, then maintain it
at M for a ﬁnite amount of time, by letting his own share α of product-
ive capacity shrink to zero. We call these two periods of time s and s0,
r e s p e c t i v e l y . W eh a v ea l r e a d yc o m p u t e ds; s0 is computed in Lemma
A.1 of the Appendix. The monopoly proﬁts accruing to the industry33
during the time period s0 will go to the innovator himself, as the com-
petitors bid their own rents to zero when purchasing their initial stock
of capital from him.
2.5. Costs of Rent-Seeking. In practice there are many ways of
maintaining a monopoly. Technical means revolve around secrecy, but
secrecy may also be enforced legally through employment contracts,
disclosure agreements, no-compete clauses and other forms of down-
stream licensing. Alternatively, a patent provides a legal entitlement
to a monopoly. Our distinction between private (a) and public rent-
seeking (b =( b0,b 1)) is roughly that between technical means that
do not require government enforcement (besides preventing theft) and
government enforcement itself. The former can range from develop-
ing a product that is diﬃcult to reverse engineer, employing safes and
private security guards, and introducing compensation schemes that
give key employees an incentive to keep the secret by giving them a
share of the monopoly proﬁt. Anton and Yao [1994] give an example
of such a scheme. On the other hand, government enforced monopoly,
whether through outright grants as is the case with patents, or through
the enforcement of downstream licensing provisions to prevent employ-
ees from competing to increase capacity beyond the monopoly level,
we view as public rent-seeking.34
Both the secrecy cost a and purchase price b of a legal monopoly
represent the private cost of rent-seeking. Each has also a social cost
wa,w b. The social cost may be either greater or less than the private
cost, as the eﬀort to seek monopoly power may either lead to a waste
of other social resources, or may generate some socially valuable goods.
In either case, a portion of the private cost may represent a transfer
payment - in the case of secrecy, the cost of an incentive scheme to
encourage key employees to keep the secret; in the case of legal pro-
tection, the cost of a bribe to a public oﬃcial. Another portion of the
private cost may represent an allocative ineﬃciency, for example, costly
engineering time spent to develop a product that is diﬃcult to reverse
engineer, or costly time spent by lobbyists or lawyers lobbying or litig-
ating. In the case of secrecy, the social cost could conceivably be even
negative, if a product that is diﬃcult to reverse engineer also happens
to be more useful to consumers. In the case of legal protection, the
social cost includes the cost of enforcement, and this can easily exceed
the private cost if the public sector provides costly enforcement services
for free. This is what is envisaged, for example by the SSSCA9,a n d
9The SSSCA is one of several proposed bills that would mandate computer hard-
ware in order to protect digital copyrighted material. Since the computer industry
is at least an order of magnitude larger than the value of digital copyrighted ma-
terial, and the cost of the mandate is to be borne entirely by that industry, the35
is currently a consequence in the U.S. of having a special court system
for hearing patent cases. Another source of social cost that is not re-
ﬂected in the price of a patent is the wasteful production of competing
or preemptive patents, often aimed only at delaying or blocking a spe-
ciﬁc patent, or the distortionary incentive to produce goods that are
patentable as opposed to nonpatentable, even if the former may have
substantially less social value than the latter. Finally, even if obvious,
we must not forget the dead-weight loss in the ﬂow of consumer surplus





















We are assuming that only the entrepreneur can purchase a legal
monopoly. There are various reasons for this. In the model, purchasing
the full legal monopoly requires having paid the entry fee b0,ac h o i c e
available only to the innovator. Even in the absence of such an entry
fee, as long as he has a slight cost advantage over his employees and
others who have the secret, the innovator will have an advantage in
potential for social cost greatly exceeding the value of the monopoly being protected
is obvious.36
bidding for the monopoly. Also, under existing law, the innovator has
a legal advantage in getting a patent. We will consider in more detail
below the consequences when a legal monopoly may be awarded to
someone other than the innovator. Notice, ﬁnally, that in the case
of simultaneous innovation, which we do not consider in this paper,
innovators will be willing to expend all expected monopoly proﬁts in
the eﬀort to grab the right to legal monopoly.
Our concern is to study the impact that the legal and institutional
environment for intellectual property has on private rent-seeking activ-
ities, and the speed of innovations’ diﬀusion. Within our framework,
this means taking b and α as policy or environmental parameters, and
characterizing how the equilibrium choice of a depends upon them. In
the last section we also consider a number of ways in which the pub-
lic rent-seeking parameters b can be endogenously determined and the
dramatic impact this endogenous determination may have on social
welfare.
3. Solving the Model
We ﬁnd the optimal strategy for the innovator based on the two op-
tions available at time t =0 , pay or do not pay b0.W e c a l l t h e ﬁrst
“IP” and the second “NIP” strategy. After characterizing the optimal37
strategy, we devote the remainder of the section to explaining the main
result. Formal proofs can be found in Appendix A. We will later exam-
ine the solution from the perspective of mechanism design and social
welfare, and ﬁnally consider rent-seeking by the public sector.
3.1. Optimal Strategies for an Innovator. Finding the optimal
strategy involves several steps. First we must ﬁnd the optimal innov-
ator strategy after the secret is revealed. Next, we describe, for given
a, the optimal plans for choosing capacity when, respectively, public
r e n ts e e k i n gi sn o ta n di su s e d .T h e nw es o l v ef o rt h eo p t i m a la when
b0 is paid, aip,a n dw h e ni ti sn o t ,anip, and for the decision whether
or not to use the second stage of the b option. Finally, we discuss the
way in which private rent-seeking expenditure a depends on the cost b
of public rent-seeking.
3.2. What to do After the Secret is Revealed. When the Pois-
son event occurs and the secret is revealed, an innovator who did not
purchase the b option at time zero faces a straightforward optimal se-
quence of action. He and his competitors increase capacity as quickly
as possible until the industry reaches M. The innovator then acts to
maximize industry proﬁts. To achieve this, he must keep the industry
productive capacity at M for as long as possible. As his competitors
continue accumulating their capital stock at the rate γ he must reduce38
his own capacity until the latter vanishes. Once he has exhausted his
capacity, the industry becomes competitive, and he earns R0(M) there-
after. (Recall that R0(k) is the competitive rent from beginning at k.)
In Lemma A.1 we show that the net present value of being at k when
the Poisson event strikes, holding a share α of capacity, and following













We show in Lemma A.2 that as γ →∞we have Rα(k) → R0(k).
When the Poisson event occurs, an innovator who has initially chosen
to pay b0 has the option to spend b1. If he chooses not to do so, he is
left with the same continuation strategy described above. If, instead,
he chooses to pay b1 a tt h et i m et h es e c r e ti sr e v e a l e d ,h ew i l lg r o w
capacity as quickly as possible until M is reached, and then remain
there forever. Recall that, after the secret is revealed, an innovator
who has turned down the IP option, faces a payoﬀ equal to Rα(k).





R1(k) − Rα(k) − b1 k<M
π(M) − Rα(M) − b1 k ≥ M
.39
Notice that, depending on k, the function µ(k) can be either positive or
negative. This means that, for a given vector b, the choice of exploit-
ing or not the public rent-seeking option when the secret is revealed
depends upon the stock of capital at that time.
The two sequences of actions described so far constitute the set of
potentially optimal strategies once the secret is revealed.
3.3. Two Strategies Before the Secret is Revealed, NIP and IP.
Begin by noticing that, without costs of rent-seeking, the best strategy
consists of reaching M as soon as possible, and remaining there forever.
Departing from such a simple accumulation strategy is optimal only
when keeping the monopoly power forever becomes too costly. This
leads, before monopoly is lost, to choosing a target position for capacity
that is lower than M. This choice serves the purpose of balancing
the maximization of period-proﬁts accruing during the monopolistic
phase (which would be achieved at M) with that of maximizing proﬁts
accruing after competition ensues (which, as shown by Lemma A.2 of
the Appendix, is achieved at Mα <M). Denote this interim target by
ξα. We show in Lemma A.5 that Mα <ξ α <M.
Fix a and the initial stock of capital k0.W e n o w d e ﬁne the two
strategies NIP and IP, and compute the corresponding proﬁts, gross of
a, for each of them.40
Strategy NIP.D on o tp a yb0.I fk0 >ξreduce capacity to ξ;i fk0 <ξ
grow capacity to ξ.I fξ is reached before the Poisson event, stay there
until the event occurs. Once the event occurs, follow the continuation
path yielding Rα.P r o ﬁts (gross of a) from the NIP strategy are shown





Notice that we ﬁnd ξα by maximizing these proﬁts with respect to ξ.
Strategy IP.P a yb0.I fk0 >Mreduce capacity to M;i fk0 <Mgrow
capacity to M.I f M is reached before the Poisson event, stay there;
when the event occurs pay b1. If the event occurs before M is reached
and µ(k) < 0 do not pay b1;g oi n s t e a df o rp a y o ﬀ Rα.I fµ(k) ≥ 0 when
the event occurs, expend b1 and allow capacity to grow until M;t h e n












The next theorem describes the optimal strategy.41
Theorem 3.1. The optimal innovator strategy is the following. If
max
a ΠIP(a) − a − b0 > max
a,ξ
ΠNIP(a,ξ) − a;
pay b0,c h o o s ea to maximize ΠIP(a)−a and follow strategy IP;o t h e r -
wise do not pay b0, choose a,ξ to maximize ΠNIP(a,ξ) − a and follow
strategy NIP.
We already mentioned that the level of capital at which accumulation
stops (until the Poisson event hits) in the NIP case satisﬁes Mα <ξ α <
M.T h i si sa s o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciency, relative to the IP strategy.10 The










We show in Lemma A.5 that if the elasticity of π(ξ) − Rα(ξ) is non-
decreasing then when γ →∞ , ξα → M. Before comparing expenditure
in private rent-seeking under the NIP (anip)a n dt h eI P( aip)s t r a t e g y ,
we characterize better the conditions under which the IP strategy is
optimal.
3.4. Opting for Public Rent-Seeking. When b0 =0 ,t h eI Ps t r a t e g y
is always adopted. Alternatively, b0 can always be set high enough to
10When λ is an increasing function of capacity or cumulated output, this ineﬃ-
ciency is stronger.42
make the NIP strategy more advantageous. Start then with the case in
which IP is optimal in expected value, and b0 h a sb e e np a i da tt =0 .
What can be said about spending b1?
If the Poisson event takes place when the stock of capital is already
at M, the innovator pays b1 if π(M) ≥ Rα(M)+b1.B e c a u s eπ(M) −
Rα(M)=( 1− α)r/γ[π(M) − R0(M)], it follows that, in this case, the
legal monopoly is enforced whenever
b1 ≤ (1 − α)
r/γ[π(M) − R0(M)].
Consider next the case in which the stock of capital k<Mat the time
the Poisson event occurs. Enforcing the legal monopoly requires pay-
ing b1, accumulating capacity until M is reached s =( 1 /γ)log(M/k)
periods later, and remaining there forever. The gain from doing this is
R1(k)−Rα(k), which is increasing in k, and has a maximum at k = M.
Assume that b1 ≤ π(M) − Rα(M) holds. At k<Mthe continuation





(π(M) − Rα(M)) ≥ b1.
This holds for all
k ≥ κ = M
∙
b1
(1 − α)r/γ(π(M) − Rα(M))
¸γ/r
.43
The IP strategy can therefore be characterized in terms of a threshold
stock at the time the Poisson event takes place: if k ≥ κ pay b1;
otherwise, do not. It would be nice if a similar threshold existed for
the initial decision to purchase the public rent-seeking option at a price
b0; in other words if the initial choice between the IP and the NIP
strategy could be reduced to having a stock k0 larger or smaller than a
certain threshold κ0. Unfortunately, this is not the case as the speciﬁc
functional form for λ(a) and all other parameters of the model play a
role in this decision. To see this, notice that the expected gain from
paying b0 is equal to
ΠIP(aip) − ΠNIP(anip,ξα)+( anip − aip).

















[π(ξα) − Rα(ξα)] − anip.44
But this procedure is not as illuminating as in the previous case. This is
because aip is diﬀerent from anip and, as we show next, the two cannot
be unambiguously ranked.
4. Evaluating Private Rent-Seeking
We move next to the issue that, from a social welfare point of view,
is at the core of our model: Which one of the two strategies, the IP
or the NIP, leads to a smaller expenditure in private secrecy? As long
as the private, a, and the social, wa, costs of private rent-seeking are
positively correlated, minimizing the former should minimize the latter.
Appendix B reports ﬁrst and second order conditions for the choice of
aip and anip; we show there that, in general, the optimal choice of either
cannot be characterized by ﬁrst order conditions only, as the relevant
functions are not concave with respect to a. We must, therefore, resort
to more indirect methods to extract additional information about the
relative magnitudes of aip and anip.
We can try estimating a bound on the equilibrium choice of anip by
looking at the private gains from keeping secrecy. The expected private
gain is the diﬀerence between the (maximized) value of ΠNIP and what
the innovator would receive at time zero without any secrecy, which is
Rα(k0).R e c a l lt h a tξα is the value at which ΠNIP is maximized. The45







When λ = ∞ beneﬁti sa tam i n i m u m ,z e r oi nf a c t( r e c a l lt h a tk0 ≤ ξα).
When λ =0or γ = ∞,b e n e ﬁti sa tam a x i m u m . I nf a c t ,f o rλ =0
or γ = ∞ the optimal choice for ξα is M. Let us concentrate on λ as
the latter can be aﬀected by proper choice of a. The maximum beneﬁt
from secrecy is (k0/M)r/γ(π(M)−Rα(M)), which is an upper bound on
a. Notice that this is increasing in k0, so expenditure in private rent-
seeking should be expected to be larger when the initial productive
capacity is relatively high. Let ˆ a =( k0/M)r/γ(π(M) − Rα(M)),a n d
ι = λ(ˆ a). Then, the optimal choice of a must result in λ ≥ ι.T h i si n








A similar argument applies to aip. The maximum gain from secrecy in







(π(M) − R(M)) + ∆O
where ∆O denotes the variation in the option value O attributable to a
decrease in λ. Notice that, in general, the two bounds are not rankable;
nevertheless, at least for values of γ that are high in relation to ι + r,46
one would expect the upper bound for aip to be larger than that for
anip,e v e nw h e n∆O is zero.
As discussed in the introduction, one major rationale for allowing
public rent-seeking is that the latter may lead to substantial lower
levels of private rent-seeking, thereby sparing society that source of
ineﬃciency. This argument would be a rather convincing one in favor
of the establishment of legal monopolies if one could show that, in
general, the level of expenditure in private rent-seeking that obtains
when the IP strategy is optimal, aip, is much lower than the one chosen
when the NIP strategy is followed, anip. Unfortunately it is not obvious
that, in the general case, aip <a nip.W eh a v ea l r e a d ys e e n ,i nf a c t ,t h a t
the maximum gains from private rent-seeking may well be higher when
the IP strategy is chosen than when it is not. Essentially the same
argument implies that, in certain important cases, aip >a nip actually
holds. To see this we proceed in steps.
Fix k0 and α ∈ (0,1) and consider ﬁrst the case in which the vector
b is high enough that IP is not optimal. Then the strategy NIP will
be adopted and a level of expenditure equal to anip will be maintained,
independently of the particular value of b. The innovator becomes
indiﬀerent between the IP and the NIP strategy when
ΠNIP(anip,ξα) − anip = ΠIP(aip) − aip − b0.47
We are interested in determining which, between anip and aip,i sh i g h e r
at this point. The cost of increasing a is the same in both cases, so let
us compare the payoﬀsf r o md e c r e a s i n gλ via a rise in a. The derivative








while the derivative of ΠIP is

















In particular, if 1/λ, the expected length of time until the secret leaks
out, is smaller than the time at which κ is reached, tκ =l o g ( κ/k0)/γ,
then O0(λ) > 0.
Next, compare the rest of the two equations term by term, holding
λ constant at λ(aNIP). The term within the ﬁrst square parentheses
is positive, while the second is negative. Because M>ξ α,t h et e r m
within the second square parentheses is always larger, in absolute value,















in the IP case. The former is always larger than the latter, since ξα
is chosen to maximize this expression and there is no immediate result
concerning aip versus anip. Hence, and contrary to the initial pre-
sumption, allowing for public rent-seeking does unambiguously reduce
wasteful expenditure in private rent-seeking.
We now complete the analysis by giving a class of examples where
aip >a nip,o re q u i v a l e n t l yλnip <λ ip. The case relatively favorable to
NIP is γ large; in this case ξα approaches M and the NIP distortion is
small. In making γ l a r g e ,w ea tt h es a m et i m ec o n s i d e rk0 small, to keep
t h el e n g t ho ft i m et ot h ep r o ﬁt peak from changing as γ gets larger.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁx k1.T h e ni tt a k e st =( 1 /γ)log(k1/k0) to move from k0
to k1;h e n c e ,t remains constant if k0 is appropriately decreased as γ is
increased. We are especially interested in the time 1/λnip,w h i c hi st h e
mean length of time it takes for the secret to leak out, and in the level
of capital κ for which µ(κ)=0 .N o t i c et h a ta sγ →∞we have κ → 0.
If it takes 1/λnip to reach κ then we see that k0 = κe−γ/λnip,w h i c h
we will adopt for purposes of constructing an example. This implies
that as γ →∞we also have O0(λ) <O< 0. On the other hand, the49












[π(M) − Rα(M)] → 0
as γ →∞ . Consequently, there are parameter values γ, λnip,b 1,b 0
such that a small decrease in b0 causes private expenditure in secrecy
to jump up from anip to aip >a nip.
We complete our discussion of private rent-seeking by considering the
dependence of a on α.N o t i c e t h a t a increases as α decreases, which
makes sense. Innovators that are operating in industries in which, when
the secret is lost, a large competitive fringe appears have a stronger
incentive to invest in keeping the secret. Also, in the case of public
rent-seeking, the threshold level κ is lower when α is small. This also
makes sense: when α is small an innovator has a stronger incentive to
grab the legal monopoly if he has chosen the IP strategy to begin with.
5. Welfare Implications
We have built our model to understand some of the welfare con-
sequences of diﬀerent IP policies. Here we attack the problem from two
points of view. First, we consider the traditional welfare or mechanism
design approach in which it is assumed that a benevolent government50
sets out to maximize social welfare. We explore the consequences of
this assumption for choices concerning b. Then we turn to the case of
more practical relevance, the case in which government is either self-
serving, or in which regulatory capture takes place. We then ask the
question of which choices of b maximize government income.
5.1. Mechanism Design Perspective. We consider primarily the
choice between IP and no IP. The latter can be obtained by simply
setting b high, although because of the problems of rent-seeking gov-
ernment outlined in the next subsection, a formal commitment, such as
a constitutional prohibition of patents of the sort used in Switzerland
until the middle 1970s, is likely to be more useful. We also comment,
when IP is the optimal policy, on the implications of the model for the
choice of the two components of b.
There are several factors one needs to consider in comparing social
welfare between IP and no IP. Allowing IP leads most obviously to the
deadweight loss of consumer surplus
(k0/M)
r/γ [U(M) − u(M)]
weighted by the probability that the IP option is used. Second, there is
the social cost due to secrecy, that is, the loss wa due to large values of
a. Third, there is the fact that without IP, the innovator will produce51
less prior to the loss of the secret, while it will produce more after it.
Let us provide an estimate for this loss. Speciﬁcally, let Sξα be the ﬂow
social loss from stopping at ξα rather than growing to M as quickly as








Finally, there is the loss wb from public rent-seeking. In the traditional
approach this latter cost, including the cost of enforcement, is ordin-
arily ignored, and we will do so here, even if this cost may be large in
practice.
The clearest case is the case discussed above in which γ is large and
k0 small. We showed in this case the IP leads to more secrecy than no
IP. In addition, we showed in this case that ξα is close to M so that
SMα is negligible. If κ<k 0 so that the IP option is always used, the
deadweight loss of consumer surplus remains signiﬁcant when there is
IP. In this case we can conclude that no IP is better than IP. A similar
conclusion is reached when λ is very large, so the secret leaks away more
or less immediately. Speciﬁcally, recall that ˆ a =( k0/M)r/γ(π(M) −
Rα(M)),a n dt h a tι = λ(ˆ a), and suppose that ι →∞ .H e r ew ec a n n o t









In this case there is not very much secrecy at all as the right hand
side goes to zero with ι →∞ , so the cost of private rent-seeking is
negligible. As in the case of large γ, we conclude that wξα is small, yet
making λ larger does not reduce the probability-weighted deadweight
loss.
T h ec a s ew h e r eκ>k 0 is less clear-cut. In this case the dead-
weight loss of consumer surplus will generally fall to zero as well, so
the comparison is now ambiguous. This, incidentally, provides a strong
rationale against setting b1 =0 .W h e nb1 =0necessarily κ<k 0.N o -
tice in passing that the threshold level κ is smaller when α is smaller.
This means higher social costs under IP: goods for which α is near zero
are goods with the potential of being easily copied and reproduced.
Consequently, the social cost of not reaching a high consumption level
is quite large. In this case public rent-seeking has a higher social cost
than otherwise.
Intellectual property is likely to be more useful when λ is small.
There are two caveats to this. When λ is small to start with, a low
level of a, with a correspondingly low level of wa, may be enough to lead
it to be zero, in which case the gain from allowing public rent-seeking53
disappears if wb > 0. Further, the lower is λ the higher is the consumer
loss from allowing for public monopoly, which further reduces the social
gains from setting b0 =0 .
T h er o l eo ft h ep a r a m e t e rα in aﬀecting the optimality of IP is also
fairly straightforward to outline. At the two opposite extremes, α =0
and α =1 , allowing for access to public rent-seeking does not appear
socially useful. In the ﬁrst case, even if private rent-seeking may be
high when losing the secret implies losing monopoly proﬁts almost im-
mediately, the consumer loss from maintaining monopoly forever via
the IP option is particularly high. In the second case, monopoly power
is already high to start with and maintained for a long time even after
the secret leaks. In this case one would expect low levels of a and,
correspondingly, low levels of wa, with small gains from introducing
public IP. Further, at high values of α,t h et a r g e ts t o c kξα is likely to
be closer to M, the target value under IP, and this also reduces the
social gains from allowing for public IP.
We have shown that π(M) ≥ Rα(M)+b1 must hold for people
to use IP. Hence, should it be optimal to have people use IP instead
of NIP, this inequality shows that the size of b should be chosen to
depend on α. What this implies is that a uniform patent policy across
diﬀerent sectors is not desirable. The optimal patent policy varies54
from sector to sector, depending on α, γ,a n dλ.I f o n e m o v e s a w a y
from the assumption of a benevolent and fully informed planner, this
observation underlies the intrinsic diﬃculty of designing an optimal
IP policy. An eﬀective patent policy requires a considerable amount
of private information to be made available to the regulator, and the
latter to engage in an equally considerable amount of ﬁne-tuning of
patent law, from sector to sector, and from market to market.
In summary, our analysis suggests that the most favorable case for
IP is when λ is not particularly high and decreases slowly, γ is low and
α is an intermediate value. Moreover, there is substantial beneﬁtf r o m
using b1 as a policy instrument rather than b0.B yu s i n gb1 we can get
κ>k 0 so that the option will not always be used, and this mitigates the
consumer deadweight loss. Indeed, taking into account the consumer
loss from low output and slow growth in productive capacity, we would
want to choose b1 large enough that no grabbing of the IP option occurs
before ξα is reached, as the latter would be reached in any case even
when IP is not allowed. Af o r t i o r i , then, one is led to conclude that
the optimal level of b1 is such that κ = M holds, if this is feasible given
the other parameter values.
5.2. Endogenous Patent Cost. What if b is determined endogen-
ously? With this we mean that there is no benevolent planner trying55
to design the socially optimal mechanism, but instead a proﬁt maxim-
izer setting the vector b in order to maximize his own beneﬁts.
The main case to consider is, obviously, the one in which the planner
is maximizing personal pecuniary beneﬁts from setting b.T h a ti s ,t h e
case in which the government is composed of self-seeking individuals
acting in their own private interest. In this case it is straightforward
to notice that the planner will set b at a level high enough to make the
innovator almost indiﬀerent, in expected terms, between the IP and
the NIP strategy. Notice that, as we have shown above, the value of
the dynamic component of the IP option O(t) increases with time. In
fact, for a given level of b1, that option has zero value until a certain
threshold is crossed, and it keeps increasing until a productive capacity
equal to M is reached. This behavior of the public sector, though, leads
us to the case considered at the end of the previous section in which
ΠNIP(anip,ξα) − anip = ΠIP(aip) − b0 − aip and O0(aip) ≥ 0.T h e nw e
have that, unambiguously, aip >a nip,s ot h a twaip >w anip,a n dt h e
availability of public rent-seeking makes everybody worse oﬀ (with the
e x c e p t i o no ft h eg o v e r n m e n t ) .
The intuition behind this result is clear: when the government sets
fees for legal enforcement of monopoly high enough to make the innov-
ator nearly indiﬀerent between using and not using the b option, then56
an innovator that is following the IP strategy has a stronger incentive
to postpone the Poisson event than an innovator that is following the
NIP strategy. This is because of two reasons. First, the innovator fol-
lowing the IP option is earning higher proﬁts from being at or near M
instead of ξα, even if this may be compensated by the fact that he gets
to M somewhat later and with lower probability. Second, the innovator
is trying to accumulate enough capital so that the threshold level κ is
crossed and the IP option O(t) takes on a positive value. We claim this
situation is more relevant than one would like to think, as the frequent
cases of regulator capture, intense lobbying to allow for extensions of
IP protection, long and costly litigations between government agencies
and monopolies (ending with monopolies buying their way out of court,
as in the Microsoft case) all seem to conﬁrm.
With optional patenting, as in this model, the innovator gets at
least the same return as without the patent system. But in practice
the patent may be awarded to someone else. Ponce [2003] points to
some subtle issues that arise under the “existing practice” component
of patent law. Less subtle issues arise when the application of the law
is endogenous: unless the government can commit to giving the patent
to the right party, there is a holdup problem. A patent now acts like a
business license - a ﬁrm cannot do business without the patent, since57
if it does not get it someone else will. In extreme cases all rent is
extracted, the innovator earns nothing, and there is no innovation.
However, it may be that it is impossible to charge for the license until
after the secret leaks out. In this case monopoly proﬁts can be either
smaller or bigger than competitive rent. So there may be less innovation
with IP than without it for this reason alone. Another possibility is that
the government does not have the capability of allocating narrow and
well speciﬁed patents to “true innovators” - it may, instead, randomly
allocate the rights by issuing vague patents to general ideas; in this case
the patent holders can charge the innovator(s) that makes use of the
general idea to which they claim a patent. This poses a big problem
due to commitment, since the government might be able to commit not
to hold up the innovator - but a bunch of scattered individuals clearly
cannot credibly do the same, nor will they. In practice we see a lot of
this: submarine patents, patenting things other people have done, and
so forth.
In the absence of commitment, it is interesting to consider in more
detail the case in which the planner sets b1 after the secret is revealed
in order to maximize his own proﬁta tt h a ts t a g e . I nt h i sc a s et h e
lack of commitment on the part of the planner may reduce his proﬁts58
from the sale of patents and lead to less private rent-seeking than oth-
erwise.11 Notice that one of the reasons for which an innovator may
want to spend a larger amount on a when the IP strategy is chosen
than when it is not is to earn the opportunity of making O(t) > 0,
because the latter increases in value when capacity is accumulated. If,
on the other hand, the planner is unable to commit to a certain level
for b1, what the innovator should expect is the planner increasing it as
long as the secret is not revealed. If this is the case, then O(t)=0
for all t and O0(a)=0as well. Hence, this crucial incentive to raise
aip above anip dissolves. In this case, even if γ is particularly large,
the private return from increasing a is higher along the NIP than the
IP strategy. These circumstances may actually lead to the least dam-
aging social arrangement, assuming the innovation rate is not aﬀected
by the planner’s inability to commit. To see this notice that, in order
to maximize earnings from b1, the planner would set b0 =0 ,t h e r e b y
luring innovators into chasing the IP strategy. In these particular cir-
cumstances the latter, as we have just argued, implies lower private
11Obviously, a complete analysis would also show that lack of commitment also
leads to much less innovation altogether, thereby making society much worse oﬀ.
Hence, the argument that follows should be taken c u mg r a n u ms a l i s .59
rent-seeking than the NIP one, thereby reducing the social cost from
secrecy.
Some ﬁnal observations are potentially interesting. When the in-
novator has private information about how valuable and costly the
innovation is, circumstances will generally make things worse (from a
social perspective) for allowing public protection of IP, since the op-
timal price to charge will necessarily have some people self-selecting
not to innovate. The political economy of patents has perhaps to some
extent escaped the attention of those large multi-national (read U.S.)
corporations lobbying most intensively in favor of international patent
protection through the WTO. The fact is that local tribunals are most
likely to award monopolies to locals. As for international tribunals, per-
haps it is wise to keep in mind the ice-skating judges at the Olympic
games.
6. Conclusion
We have built a model of innovation in which legal protection of in-
tellectual property may play a socially valuable role. This potentially
useful role follows from two assumptions: (i) that the sole innovator has
access to a costly private technology to keep secrecy and avoid compet-
ition from imitators, (ii) that monopoly rights may also be purchased60
via the public legal system. One would hope that the availability of
the public option leads to a smaller social cost of keeping the monopoly
power by inducing the innovator to waste less resources in the private
secrecy-keeping (and rent-seeking) technology. By allowing for a trade-
oﬀ between public and private rent-seeking, we therefore entertain the
possibility that the existence of patents and similar legal devices may
ﬁnd a welfare justiﬁcation in the reduction of wasteful private rent-
seeking they bring about. The ﬁnal result is rather mixed. Even in
this, purposefully favorable, setting, the case for patents and legal IP
protection turns out to endure analytical scrutiny poorly.
We show, in fact, that even when a benevolent central planner ex-
ists who is able to fully commit to the socially optimal policy, legal
IP protection is desirable only under special parametric circumstances.
While it is far from obvious that such circumstances, as detailed in the
previous section, are empirically relevant, it should be kept in mind
that, according to the analysis carried out here, the optimal patent
policy is one that treats diﬀerent goods, diﬀerent industries, and dif-
ferent markets diﬀerently. Therefore, even leaving aside the realism of
the parametric assumptions under which patents are a socially useful
tool, one remains with the need of justifying the possession, on the
part of the supposedly benevolent planner, of the detailed information61
necessary to ﬁne tune the cost of patents to the speciﬁcr e q u i r e m e n t s
of each case. Mentioning the human fallibility of benevolent planners
brings to mind another of their most interesting properties: lack of
existence. Which leads to what we consider the main, or at least the
most surprising, result of this paper.
We show that, when the cost of public IP protection is high, then the
innovator spends more when the IP option is available than when it is
not. Next, we show that selﬁsh governments pursuing their self-interest
will push the cost of providing public IP protection exactly toward that
level. In conclusion, our analysis shows that the availability of patents
leads to a lose-lose proposition: when IP is set and managed by a self-
interested government, private expenditure in secrecy is at its highest,
and the deadweight loss for consumers due to monopoly power is also
maximized.
There are many objections that can be raised to our analysis -
for example, capital market imperfections may lead to some unpriced
spillovers. But these types of frictions are not unique to investment in
ideas and creations - and while investment of all types may be reduced
by capital market imperfections, it is not ordinarily suggested that the
solution is a government grant of monopoly power. Our results here
point to the ambiguity of theoretical analysis of intellectual property.62
It is clear, as we argue in this context, that allowing the government to
grant monopolies is extremely dangerous - and we should require clear
and compelling evidence before doing so. Since theoretical argument
is insuﬃcient to settle the point, since empirical evidence is almost
non-existent, and since anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that in-
tellectual property reduces rather than encourages innovation, there
should be a strong presumption against patents and copyrights. It is
our view that they should be abolished pending strong and persuasive
evidence that they actually do some good.63
Appendix A. Proofs
Recall that t(k) is the time it takes to reach k from k0 when the cap-
ital stock grows at the rate γ. A useful consequence of this deﬁnition,
o f t e nu s e di no u rc a l c u l a t i o n s ,i st h a te−r(t(κ)−t(ξ)) =( ξ/κ)r/γ.
A.1. The function Rα(k).
Lemma A.1. The maximum net present value of proﬁts starting with a
productive capacity k when the Poisson event strikes and the IP option













Further, Rα(M) ≤ π(M), and as γ →∞ , Rα(k) → R0(k).T h et i m e
spent at M is s0 =( 1 /γ)log(1/(1 − α)).
Proof. Since it cannot be optimal to allow the capital stock to exceed
M before the Poisson event, we may assume k ≤ M, where recall that
M is the level of productive capacity at which π(c) is maximized. After
the Poisson event, the capacity controlled by the competitive fringe is
(1 − α)k,a l w a y sg r o w i n ga tγ. Innovator’s capacity is αk.W ea r g u e d
in the text that the optimal plan for the innovator is to allow his own
capital to grow until industry capacity reaches M, then decrease his
own capital to keep industry capacity at M until he runs out of capital.64
Starting at k,i tt a k e ss =( 1 /γ)log(M/k) units of time for industry
capacity to reach M.
To calculate the length of the interim period during which the in-
dustry remains at M,o b s e r v et h a ts0 units of time after reaching M




When this is equal to αM the innovator runs out of capital; this occurs
when s0 =( 1 /γ)log(1/(1 − α)).
We are now in position to compute the value for the innovator of
a stock of capital k when the event strikes, and a share (1 − α) of
















Since M maximizes π, which is single-peaked, it follows directly that
Rα(M) ≤ π(M).S i m p l i ﬁcation yields the expression given in the con-
clusion, and the limit as γ →∞follows directly from this expression.
We now show
Lemma A.2. Rα is single peaked. The (unique) maximizer Mα satis-
ﬁes Rα(Mα)=π(Mα),i si n c r e a s i n gi nα and M1 = M.65
Proof. Recall that R0(k)=r
R ∞
0 e−rtπ(keγt)dt. We may introduce the
change of variable κ = keγt so that γt =l o g ( κ/k), dκ = γkeγtdt =







Taking the ﬁrst derivative of R0(k) with respect to k we ﬁnd
R
0
0(k)=( r/γk)[R0(k) − π(k)].































0(k)+( r/γk)[Rα(k) − R0(k)]
=( r/γk)[Rα(k) − π(k)].
Since Rα(M) ≤ π(M) and π is single-peaked, Rα is also single-peaked.
Moreover, it is clear that the unique maximizer Mα satisﬁes Rα(Mα)=
π(Mα). Since increasing α strictly increases Rα it strictly increases66
R0
α(k) and since Rα is single peaked, it follows that Mα is strictly
increasing.
Finally, substituting into Rα(k),w eﬁnd R1(M)=π(M).T h i si m p l i e s
that M1 = M.
A.2. Value of Optimal Strategies. In doing computations that in-
volve plans of growing as quickly as possible to a particular target
capacity level ξ and then staying there, it is convenient to deﬁne the
corresponding time path of the capacity as
k(t,ξ)=m i n {k0e
γt,ξ}.
It is useful also to deﬁne the proﬁt from sticking to this time path of






where, of course, ΠM(∞)=R1(k0).
Lemma A.3. The average present value proﬁt when the IP option is
not used, the expenditure in private rent-seeking is a and the pre-event





Proof. Our ﬁrst step is to derive the expressions used in the main text
























Consider ﬁrst t<τ.T h e n
Πξ(t)+e
−rtRα(k(t,ξ)) = Rα(k0).























































Lemma A.4. The average present value proﬁt( n e to fb)w h e nt h eI P











Proof. Recall that in the text we deﬁned the gain over Rα(k) from the





R1(k) − Rα(k) − b1 k<M
π(M) − Rα(M) − b1 k ≥ M
.















and the expression for ΠIP(a) follows directly from Lemma A.3.69
A.3. Choice of ξα. Finally, we characterize ξα for the NIP and the IP
strategy, respectively. Deﬁne m(ξ)=π(ξ) − Rα(ξ).









Suppose in addition that the elasticity of m(ξ) is non-decreasing. Then
the solution of the ﬁrst order condition is unique. This solution ξα is
increasing in γ,d e c r e a s i n gi nλ,a n dr;i ts a t i s ﬁes M>ξ α >M α.
Moreover, as γ →∞ , ξα → M.
























When the elasticity of m(ξ) is non-decreasing, it is apparent that this
equation has a unique solution. We already observed that it cannot be
optimal to allow the capital stock to exceed M before the Poisson event,70
that is, ξα <M .B y L e m m a A . 2 Rα(Mα)=π(Mα). This, together
with the fact that π0(Mα) > 0 and R0
α(Mα)=0 , implies ξα >M α.
Finally, we notice that ξα is increasing in γ and decreasing in λ and
r, as intuition would suggest. The behavior of ξα at large values of
γ is particularly relevant for our analysis. From Lemma A.2 when
γ →∞ , Rα(k) → R0(k). This and the ﬁrst order condition given
above imply that when γ →∞ , ξ (π0(ξ) − R0
0(ξ)) = 0 must hold. But
R0
0(k)=( r/γk)[R0(k) − π(k)] implies that R0
0(k)=0for all k when
γ →∞ . Hence, the ﬁrst order condition boils down to ξαπ0(ξα)=0 ,
which implies ξα → M for γ →∞ .
Appendix B. Optimal Secrecy
Here we discuss the optimal choices of anip and aip. Inspection of
the functions ΠNIP(a,ξ) and ΠIP(a) shows they are not concave with
respect to a,h e n c eb o t hﬁrst and second order conditions need to be
checked, and the global maximum cannot be characterized directly.


























The left-hand side is positive because λ
0(a) < 0 and k0 <ξ α.I ti sn o t
monotone though, either increasing or decreasing, which allows for the
presence of more than one critical point. We are interested in critical























where A(a) is positive at all values of a. The function λ(a) was assumed
decreasing and convex. Inspection of the right-hand side of this expres-
sion shows that, if it ever becomes negative, it will do so for values of
a that are relatively large. One can verify that this is certainly the
case, for example, with the simple functional form λ(a)=λ/a. Hence,
when many critical points exist, we should expect the maximizers to
correspond to the highest valued among them.
The ﬁrst order condition determining aip contains an additional factor
beside those computed for the case of anip. This additional element is72
















does not have a constant sign. It is uniformly zero whenever b is such
that µ(k0eγt) ≤ 0.W h e nµ(k0eγt) > 0, O0(a) is positive at low values of
a (high values of λ(a)), becoming negative as a increases (λ decreases).
The intuition is the following: at low values of a, λ is large and the
density λ(a)e−λ(a)t places a high probability to the Poisson event taking
place early, that is, at low values of t. As we will soon show, the value of
µ(k0eγt) increases with time. Hence, at low values of a the value of the
option O(a) is likely to be zero. As a increases and λ(a) decreases this
shifts part of the distribution toward periods in which µ(k0eγt) > 0,
thereby increasing O(a). In other words, an innovator who follows the
IP strategy needs to buy time, via a, to allow O(a) to increase its value,
hence O0(a) > 0 initially. The ﬁrst order condition determining aip is
therefore
λ








Considerations altogether analogous to those for the case of anip apply
also in relation to the uniqueness of the critical values for aip,a n dt h e
negative deﬁniteness of ∂2ΠIP/∂a2.74
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